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Liquidity Shocks, Systemic Risk and Market Collapse: 




Traditional explanations of market crashes rely on the collapse of an asset price bubble or the 
exacerbation of an information asymmetry sufficient to cause less-informed participants to 
withdraw from the market. We show that markets can crash even though asset prices have not 
deviated from fundamental values and information is shared symmetrically among all market 
participants. We present a model in which markets crash when investors shift their beliefs about 
the liquidity of the secondary market. While such shifts in liquidity may be a factor in explaining 
many market crashes, the collapse of the market for perpetual floating-rate notes (perps) provides 
an especially clear illustration of the theory because a shift in liquidity beliefs appears to have 
been the sole determinant of the market crash.  Such a shift can be precipitated by a systemic 
liquidity shock that is transitory or permanent. The latter proved to be the case with perps 
because perceptions of the liquidity of the secondary market were permanently altered. In 
addition to providing new insights into why markets crash, our findings are particularly relevant 
for unseasoned financial products that are often priced and marketed on the assumption that 
liquid secondary markets will develop. The perp episode also highlights the importance of broad 
placement of securities.  Since market liquidity arises endogenously from the diversity of 
liquidity needs across the investor base, the broader the investor base, the lower the probability of 
a systemic liquidity shock.  We also show how simple modifications in security design can 
mitigate the impact of such a shock should it occur. 3
Liquidity, according to Keynes, offers a classic example of the fallacy of composition: 
what is true for a part is not necessarily true for the whole. The ability to reverse 
positions and get out quickly vanishes when everyone tries to do it at once. – Merton 
Miller (1991). 
 
I. Introduction   
  The literature on asset bubbles and asymmetric information applies most readily to 
markets for equity, junk bonds,
1 or more generally, markets where rational investors can disagree 
about future cash flows or can be prevented by various market imperfections from exploiting 
large price deviations from fundamental value.  On the other hand the literature on irrational 
bubbles may apply when assets are owned primarily by unsophisticated investors who may 
exhibit irrational behavior such as the case of Swedish lottery bonds studied by Green and 
Rydqvist (1997).  But, these explanations for market crashes seem less plausible in the case of 
markets for high-quality, fixed-income securities such as government and corporate bonds where 
the determination of fundamental value is usually straightforward, deviations from this value are 
easy to exploit and trading tends to be dominated by sophisticated, institutional investors. 
Perpetual floating-rate notes (perps)
2 fall into this latter category. Issuers of perps generally had 
very high credit ratings and perps were traded in well-organized markets by sophisticated 
investors, primarily banks and other institutions.  Our model, which emphasizes beliefs about the 
liquidity of the secondary market, explains market crashes in such cases where future cash flows 
are not in doubt and information is shared symmetrically across all market participants. While 
1 Well known episodes in this category are the collapse of the junk bond market, triggered by a series of defaults 
culminating in the default of the Campeau Group in September 1989, and the collapses of the LDC debt market, first 
in August 1982 triggered by the Mexican default and more recently in August 1998 triggered by the Russian default. 
 
2 Perps are floating rate notes (FRNs) of infinite maturity, bearing a coupon indexed to a benchmark rate (usually the 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, LIBOR) and re-set at fixed intervals (usually every three or six months). 
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both information effects (pertaining to fundamental value) and liquidity effects (pertaining to 
investor clientele) may contribute to market crashes in general, the perp market crash provides a 
particularly clear illustration of the role of liquidity effects in causing a market to collapse.   
  The rise and collapse of the perp market is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the prices 
of three obligations—a perpetual floating rate note, preference shares (which were subordinate to 
the perp), and a long-dated floating rate note (FRN)—of the National Westminster Bank 
(NatWest), a major U.K. clearing bank. After trading steadily at its par value, the price of the 
NatWest perp shows a sudden decline, which coincided with the collapse of the perp market. 
Clearly, this collapse cannot be attributed to a decline in the creditworthiness of NatWest since 
the prices of its long-dated FRNs and preference shares held steady while the prices of its perps 
dropped. 
  [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The proximate cause of the perp collapse was a rumor that began circulating in December 
1986, of an impending change in international banking regulations. This change, if implemented, 
was expected to affect holders of the vast majority of the outstanding stock of perps.
3 The rumor 
appears to have caused a large number of perp investors to attempt to reduce their holdings, 
creating liquidity demands that were highly correlated across the investor base. This liquidity 
shock did not affect the anticipated cash flow from the perps in any way, yet caused a dramatic 
downturn in market liquidity and asset values that turned out to be permanent. This episode 
provides a particularly striking illustration of the importance of beliefs regarding the breadth of 
3  Primarily banks issued perps, and 80% of the outstanding perps were thought to be held by Japanese banks at the 
time of the collapse. The rumor was that the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices 
would require that banks deduct holdings of perps issued by other banks in computing their capital for regulatory 
purposes. See Herring and Litan (1995) or Wagster (1996) for further discussion of the negotiation of the 1988 Basel 
Accord. 
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the secondary market in determining its liquidity and asset prices.  We argue that the drop in 
price experienced by perps was the result of investors losing confidence in the liquidity of the 
secondary market. 
As Kindleberger (1978) has noted, market crashes are often viewed as the bursting of a 
bubble in which asset prices have diverged significantly above their fundamental values. Allen 
and Gale (2000) review a variety of models that can explain how bubbles can develop, and 
present their own theory, which relies on imperfect information and an agency problem that leads 
investors to bid up asset prices far above what they would be willing to pay if they were fully 
exposed to all potential losses.  Our model does not depend on imperfect information regarding 
the fundamentals that determine asset prices, nor does it rely on agency problems. 
Of course, markets can collapse even in the absence of a pronounced bubble in asset 
prices. Such market crashes can be explained by a worsening of information asymmetry about 
asset price fundamentals across market participants as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten 
(1989), or Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991). In these models, uninformed investors withdraw 
from the market for fear of being taken advantage of by better-informed market participants.  The 
withdrawal of uninformed investors reduces demand for the asset and causes prices to fall. We 
achieve a comparable result in our model without assuming that information regarding asset-
pricing fundamentals is asymmetrically distributed across investors.
4  This difference has 
important implications about how a crisis can be resolved.  If the crash is caused by an 
exacerbation of asymmetric information, it can be resolved by alleviating the information 
4 However, the implications of our model are similar to Glosten (1989) in that reducing competition will reduce the 
susceptibility of market makers to systemic liquidity shocks. 
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asymmetry.  If the crash is caused by a liquidity shock, however, prices will rebound only if 
market participants believe that the liquidity shock was transitory. 
We define a “liquid market” as a market where participants can execute large transactions 
at short notice with minimal impact on the price. An asset will be liquid if it is traded in a liquid 
market.
5 Generally, the liquidity of a secondary market depends on its depth, breadth and 
resiliency as well as its organizational structure and the reliability of clearing and settlement 
arrangements. Liquidity in our model, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a characteristic 
determined by the diversity of liquidity needs among investors who hold the asset. In our model, 
market participants form beliefs about future liquidity by observing past trading, and these 
liquidity beliefs in turn determine their valuation of the asset.  
“Liquidity shocks” are unanticipated changes in the demand for liquidity.  We consider 
two kinds of liquidity shocks:  “idiosyncratic liquidity shocks” that are independently distributed 
across holders of an asset; and “systemic liquidity shocks” that are identically distributed, 
causing all investors to want to trade identically at the same time. Clearly, a systemic liquidity 
shock that causes investors to herd can render a market illiquid. In addition, we consider two 
durations of market illiquidity caused by systemic liquidity shocks:  “transitory illiquidity” that is 
quickly reversed and “permanent illiquidity” which arises from the withdrawal of market 
participants due to their belief that the risk of systemic liquidity shocks exceeds the threshold for 
a liquid market to exist. Such liquidity shocks need not be related to asset fundamentals, although 
in many historical cases, herding behavior may have been triggered by news about asset 
fundamentals.  
Since liquid assets are easily marketable, they will be priced at a premium to illiquid 
5 Of course, even in the absence of a liquid market, high-quality short-term securities are regarded as liquid due to 
their imminent cash settlement. 7
assets. We define the price differential between liquid and illiquid assets as the “marketability 
premium”. 
Like Romer (1993) we assume that trading can reveal information that affects asset 
prices, but the information in Romer’s model (and other papers in this genre) is about asset price 
fundamentals.  In contrast, we focus on the information generated by the trading process relating 
to potential liquidity demands of market participants, especially the extent to which these 
demands are correlated.  
We explain the availability of markets, the cost of transacting in them, asset prices, and 
trading volume as the outcome of the demand for liquidity by individual market participants and 
their beliefs about the future availability of a liquid secondary market.  This extends the work of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), who relate asset prices 
to transactions costs and other liquidity measures. While the behavior of market participants that 
precipitates market collapse in our model can be characterized as herding (Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992)), in our model market 
participants collectively update their beliefs about future market liquidity by observing past 
market behavior, in contrast to the existing literature where herding occurs when one set of 
individuals learns sequentially from another.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop our basic 
theoretical model, which relates asset prices to the liquidity of the secondary market. In Section 
III, we examine how investor beliefs about future market liquidity can be formed by observing 
past states of the market, and how changes in these beliefs can lead to shifts in market liquidity. 
In Section IV, we discuss the rise and fall of the market for perps in the context of our theoretical 8
framework, and provide a brief postscript on attempts to restore liquidity to the market. Section 
V provides some concluding observations.   
 
II.  Liquidity and Asset Prices 
In this section, we develop our basic theoretical model and relate liquidity to asset prices 
by considering three cases that are differentiated by assumptions about the liquidity of the 
secondary market. In the first case, investors experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and the 
secondary market permits investors to mutualize their liquidity shocks by trading. The second 
case is identical to the first in all respects except that no secondary market is available. 
Comparing these two cases permits us to show how the liquidity of the secondary market affects 
asset prices. In the third case, investors experience a systemic liquidity shock.  Since a systemic 
liquidity shock cannot be mutualized through trading, the secondary market will collapse 
resulting in a price that is identical to the second case in which there is no secondary market. 
 
II.A. Model 
We model a two-period economy with a group of N risk averse investors who are 
identical at time 0. Each investor is endowed at time 0 with 1 unit of the single risky asset and 1 
unit of the riskless asset.  The risky asset pays off a random quantity of the numeraire riskless 
asset, v , at time 2, where  () 1 Ev >  . All investors know that the return, v , is distributed normally 
with mean v  and variance 
2
v σ .  The risk-free return is assumed to be zero. Investors maximize 
negative exponential utility functions of their wealth at time 2,  2 W :  22 () e x p ( ) UW  =       a W −−, 
where a ≥ 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion. 9
All investors experience identically distributed liquidity shocks at time 1, with the 
distribution of these shocks being known ex ante at time 0.  In general, such shocks can arise due 
to a broad range of events that give rise to a change in the investor’s valuation of the risky asset 
without new information about its fundamental payoff.  In the literature, liquidity shocks have 
been most frequently motivated as arising from shocks to preferences as in Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) or to endowments as in Glosten (1989) or Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991). While such 
shocks will also give rise to changes in the investor’s marginal valuation of the security, for ease 
of exposition, we shall follow the formulation of Michaely and Vila (1995) and Michaely, Vila 
and Wang (1996), and model such shocks as idiosyncratic tax or regulatory effects that change 
the way in which individual investors value a security even in the absence of new information 
regarding the cash flows associated with the security. This approach fits the example of perps 
particularly well since the proximate cause of the collapse was a rumored regulatory change that 
would have effectively imposed a regulatory tax on some investors who held perps. We 
characterize this shock as a random additive increment,  i θ , to the payoff v  of the risky asset to 
investor i.  i θ  is also distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 
2
θ σ , and is independent of v . 
As in Karpoff (1986), differences in personal valuation caused by these shocks induce trading 
when it is possible. 
The correlation of liquidity shocks across investors is determined by the realization of one 
of two possible states, “idiosyncratic” or “systemic” which will be revealed at time 1. In the 
idiosyncratic state, liquidity shocks are independently distributed across investors. In the 
systemic state, liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated across all investors. The implications are 
quite straightforward. If the idiosyncratic state occurs, there is mutual benefit to trading at time 1 
since shocks are uncorrelated.  By trading, investors can mutualize the risk of the idiosyncratic 10
liquidity shocks. But if shocks are perfectly correlated, investors are unable to mutualize their 
liquidity shocks by trading at time 1 and prices will simply adjust to reflect the shock, just as in a 
Milgrom-Stokey (1982) no-trade equilibrium. The secondary market will collapse. 
We assume that trading at time 1 occurs in a simple batch market in which all trades clear 
at the same price subject to a bid-ask spread. Trading is facilitated by M identical, competing, 
risk-neutral market makers each of whom incurs a fixed cost of C in setting up the market for 
each round of trade. These costs are recovered by the bid-ask spread. In a no-trade equilibrium 
that accompanies a systemic liquidity shock, market makers lose the cost sunk into setting up the 
market.  
All market participants use a Bayesian updating framework (developed in Section III) to 
update their ex ante probability beliefs about the state of the market by observing past states. The 
market makers offer a market only if, ex ante, the (subjective) probability that an idiosyncratic 
state will prevail exceeds a cut-off level beyond which their expected profit is non-negative. If 
investors expect that the secondary market will be liquid at time 1, they will attach a value to 
being able to rebalance their portfolios optimally at time 1, based on what they learn at time 1 
about their liquidity shocks. This value (marketability premium) will be reflected in the time 0 
equilibrium price of the risky asset.  For tractability, we assume that market makers set bid-ask 
spreads as follows: 
                      i i X P P 1 1 1 ∆ + = λ ,        (1) 11
where λ > 0 is determined by competition among market makers.
6  1 P  is the market-clearing price 
in the absence of transactions costs,  i X1 ∆  is the trade size of individual i and  i P 1  is the actual 
price paid or received by individual i. 
 
II.B. Equilibrium at t = 1 and t = 0 
With the transactions costs described in the preceding section, the investor’s time 1 








Max E a W X v P X X θλ   −− + + − − −   
                           (2) 
where  ˆ
i θ  is the liquidity shock realized by investor i. We consider three cases in turn. 
 
Case 1: Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks and a Liquid Secondary Market at t = 1. 
This would be the case of perfect investor heterogeneity (maximum market breadth for 
given N), where each investor’s liquidity need is uncorrelated with the liquidity needs of the 
other investors. In this case, the equilibrium price at time 1, 
1
1 P  becomes: 
12
1 ˆ













= ∑                      (4) 
and the optimal portfolio adjustment of individual i,  i i i X X X 0 1 1 − = ∆  will be: 
6 The transactions cost structure that we are assuming here is equivalent to the structure in Kyle (1985), where λ is 
the inverse measure of market depth. However, the rationale is different in Kyle’s model since λ is derived from his 
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While the cost of transacting does not affect 
1
1 P , it depresses the volume of trade. When λ 
becomes very large,  1 Q  shrinks and the market effectively shuts down. 
Noting that  ˆ
A θ → 0 as N → ∞, we observe that a liquid secondary market enables 
investors to adjust to liquidity shocks at an equilibrium price which is not affected by the 
liquidity shocks. Such as market provides a valuable option to investors.  Even if an investor 
does not plan to sell the asset before maturity, the investor’s future portfolio allocation 
preferences are inevitably subject to uncertainty and so the opportunity to sell the claim in a 
liquid secondary market enhances the investor’s willingness to buy the claim in the primary 
market.  We examine next how this is reflected in the time 0 price. 
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yielding the time 0 equilibrium price, 
1
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        (8) 
 
As λ → 0 and N → ∞, 
1
0 P → → → → 
2
v va σ − .   Given idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, N becomes a 
measure of market breadth. Hence, with frictionless trading and an infinitely broad market, 13
investors will no longer price the risk of their idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, since this risk can be 
perfectly mutualized by trading. 
Total expected market maker revenue, 


















+ ∑               (9) 
 
Case 2: Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks with No Secondary Market at t = 1. 
In contrast to the previous case, investors do not expect to be able to satisfy their liquidity 
needs at time 1 because there is no secondary market. Since there is no portfolio rebalancing at 
time 1, the investor’s time 0 problem reduces to: 
{ }
0
00 0 0  exp ( )
i
ii i X
Max E a W X v P θ   −− + + −  
                  (10) 
yielding the time 0 equilibrium price, 
2
0 P : 
22 2
0 v P va a θ σσ =− − .                         (11) 
In contrast to the case when the market is liquid at time 1, the risk of a liquidity shock at time 1 is 
fully discounted in 
2
0 P  because there is no possibility for investors to mutualize these shocks by 
trading.
7   
Since there is no difference in the fundamental determinants of the price of the risky asset 
between Cases 1 and 2, the price differential between the two cases is entirely determined by the 
absence of the secondary market in Case 2. The price differential Φ, the marketability premium, 
is: 
7 Note that even in the previous case, it follows from (8) that the same result obtains in the limit when λ → ∞.  


















 −  Φ= − − ≥
−   ++    
                  (12) 
Given idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, we can infer that the liquidity-driven price differential Φ is 
higher, the greater the demand for liquidity (as measured by the volatility of liquidity shocks 
2
θ σ ), the greater the market breadth (as measured by the number of investors N) and the lower the 
transactions costs. Note that the latter, which is parameterized by λ, will be minimized by the 
competition among market makers. Given a level of liquidity demand, λ provides a measure of 
the degree of liquidity supplied to the market by the market makers. In the limiting case of λ → 0 
and N → ∞ that we considered previously, Φ will converge to 
2 a θ σ . At the opposite end of the 
liquidity spectrum, the case of λ → ∞, Φ will converge to 0. Thus, the marketability premium, 
Φ, will be bounded by 0 ≤ Φ ≤ 
2 a θ σ , and the value of Φ will reflect the degree of marketability. 
 
Case 3: Systemic Liquidity Shocks Causing an Illiquid Secondary Market at t = 1. 
  In this case, the investor’s situation will be identical to the previous case in which there 
was no secondary market. Since investors expect to experience the same liquidity shock at time 
1, they will have no opportunity to mutualize these shocks by trading. Thus, the secondary 
market will break down and the price will adjust without trade as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982). 
The risk of liquidity shocks will again be fully discounted in the time 0 equilibrium price. Hence, 
the time 0 price in this case, 
3
0 P , will be equal to the time 0 price in Case 2, 
2
0 P . Obviously, both 
trading volume and market maker revenue will be zero in Cases 2 and 3. 
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II.C. Transition from a Liquid to an Illiquid Secondary Market 
It is clear from the above analysis that if the secondary market collapses, the security will 
experience a price decline of Φ ≥ 0 reflecting the elimination of the marketability premium. This 
is consistent with the price drop observed in the perp market. Moreover, as we will discuss later, 
the price drop experienced by perps is consistent with the price differentials between liquid and 
illiquid securities in other markets.  
The analysis of the three cases in this section proceeded on the assumption that market 
participants had perfect foresight about the liquidity of the secondary market, and rationally 
incorporated their beliefs in asset prices. Furthermore, the decision by market makers to open or 
close the secondary market was assumed to be exogenous to the model. Next, we focus on the 
question of how market participants form beliefs about future market liquidity, and how this 
process can lead to an endogenous shift in the liquidity of the secondary market that affects asset 
prices. 
 
III. Beliefs about Liquidity 
In this section we extend our theoretical framework to examine how beliefs about 
liquidity in the secondary market evolve and change, drawing on the literature on herding and 
informational cascades (Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 
(1992) and Banerjee (1992)) as well as the literature on market breakdowns in the presence of 
asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991)).  
Informational cascades occur when individuals deduce the information of preceding 
market participants sequentially by observing their behavior.  Similarly, in our model individuals 
deduce the degree of liquidity of the secondary market by observing past states of the secondary 16
market. As we demonstrate, when the true probability of a systemic liquidity shock is low, a 
continued sequence of experiences with a liquid secondary market can cause market participants 
to underestimate the probability of a systemic liquidity shock.  In our model, market participants 
update their beliefs in Bayesian fashion, so that their subjective probability of a systemic liquidity 
shock progressively diminishes as the sequence of periods without a systemic liquidity shock 
continues. This can cause security prices to deviate from the level that reflects the true 
probability of a systemic liquidity shock. A reevaluation occurs only when market participants 
experience a liquidity shock that turns out to be systemic. 
 
III.A. Bayesian Updating Framework 
Market makers offer markets at time 1 and investors value the risky asset at time 0 based 
on their subjective (uniform) probability estimate of the occurrence of the state in which liquidity 
shocks are idiosyncratic (liquid state). At the outset, we assume that the subjective probability 
estimate of the state in which a systemic liquidity shock occurs (illiquid state) is low enough for 
market makers to open the secondary market. The indicator  t χ  = 1 if the illiquid state occurs and 
0 otherwise.     
We assume that the unconditional probability of the illiquid state is π. Market participants 
form a subjective probability estimate of the occurrence of the two types of events. The prior 
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8 See, e.g., DeGroot (1970) and Guttentag and Herring (1984). 
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As shown by DeGroot (1970), the posterior probability distribution is also a Beta distribution 
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where n + 1 is the number of observations in the sequence of events and y is the total number of 
illiquid states observed in this sequence. 
The market participants form their subjective probability beliefs as follows: 
1.  If the preceding n + 1 events are liquid states, the subjective probability assessment after 
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As n increases, the subjective probability of an illiquid state goes to zero. 
2.  If the immediately preceding event is an illiquid state, then a new sequence of 
observations begins and the market participants form their subjective probability 
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This means that as the number of periods (n) without a systemic shock increases, the subjective 
probability of a systemic liquidity shock will continue to decline relative to the unconditional 18
probability of such a shock. The occurrence of a systemic liquidity shock will cause market 
participants to overestimate initially the probability that a systemic liquidity shock will reoccur.  
But, if the secondary market reopens, as the number of periods without an additional systemic 
liquidity shock increases, the subjective probability of a systemic liquidity will again decline, 
ultimately falling below the unconditional probability. This shift in subjective probability of a 
systemic liquidity shock is the critical determinant of whether market makers will open a 
secondary market. 
 
III.B. Liquidity Shifts 
Given the market set-up costs (C), the number of market makers (M), the total expected 
market maker revenue derived in (9), and the assumption that bid-ask spreads are set 
competitively such that the market makers’ expected profits will be zero, we show in the 
appendix that the necessary condition for a market to be offered is: 
2
2








≥                 (19) 
where ξ is the ex ante subjective probability attached by the market makers to a systemic liquidity 
shock. For a given value of λ, dealers are more likely to make a secondary market (the left-hand-
side of (19) is more likely to exceed one), the lower the subjective probability of a systemic 
liquidity shock (ξ), the lower the fixed costs of making a market (C), and the lower the number of 
market-makers (M). As in Glosten (1989), increases in the number of competitive market makers 
may render the secondary market more vulnerable to collapse.  In Glosten’s model the result is 
driven by the reduction in the ability of market makers to withstand losses to informed traders 
when competition reduces their profits.  In our model, the result is drive by the reduction in the 
ability of market makers to withstand a systemic liquidity shock.   19
Equation (19) defines a threshold level of the subjective probability of a systemic 
liquidity shock above which dealers will not be willing to make a secondary market because they 
do not expect it to be profitable.  The threshold level is the value of ξ that equates the left-hand-
side of (19) to one. Whether the secondary market is reopened after a systemic liquidity shock 
depends on the unconditional probability (π) of a systemic liquidity shock. It follows from (18) 
that prior to the first occurrence of a systemic liquidity shock, the ex ante subjective probability 
of a systemic liquidity shock (ξ) will fall below π.  But after the occurrence of a systemic 
liquidity shock ξ will rise above π.  If π is sufficiently high, ξ may rise above the threshold level 
at which market makers can expect to earn non-negative profits. As a result, they will not reopen 
the secondary market. In contrast, when the unconditional probability of a systemic liquidity 
shock is sufficiently low, even though ξ rises above π, market makers will expect to earn non-
negative profits and so they will reopen the secondary market. 
Our theoretical framework thus shows how the availability of a secondary market can 
give rise to a marketability premium and how this marketability premium can grow as investors 
gain confidence in the liquidity of the secondary market.  We also show how this confidence can 
collapse in the event of a systemic liquidity shock, leading to either transitory or permanent 
illiquidity in the secondary market depending on how the expectations of market participants are 
changed by the systemic liquidity shock. We next turn to the details of the perp market to 
illustrate our theoretical framework.  
 
IV. The Rise and Fall of the Perp Market 
The perp was introduced in the early eighties and was quickly hailed as a successful 
financial innovation. In this section, we examine the rise and fall of the perp market, and link its 20
initial success to the growth of investor confidence about the liquidity of the secondary market 
for perps, and its collapse to a systemic liquidity shock that substantially increased expectations 
of the reoccurrence of a systemic liquidity shock and led market makers to abandon the market 
permanently. 
 
IV.A. The Rise 
The perp was a simple variation on the Floating Rate Note (FRN).  The standard FRN is a 
bond bearing a coupon that changes at a set interval (usually every three or six months) over the 
life of the bond.  The coupon is a fixed margin or spread over some benchmark rate (usually the 
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)).   
The FRN has particular investor appeal when interest rates are expected to be volatile 
because the principal value of the FRN is likely to be much more stable than that of a 
conventional, fixed-rate bond of identical maturity.  Indeed if the borrower’s relative credit 
standing (as reflected in the spread over the benchmark rate) has not changed since issued, the 
FRN will normally be repriced at par on the day on which the coupon is reset. 
The first perp was issued on behalf of National Westminster Bank in April 1984.
9  The 
original NatWest issue was junior, subordinated debt, ranking in payment priority after other 
outstanding debt, but before common or preferred stock.  Banks experienced pressure to increase 
their capital during the mid-eighties and sought permission to count issuance of perps as capital 
for regulatory purposes. The Bank of England did not permit this first issue to qualify as 
9  Citicorp issued a quasi-perp in 1980. Since this issue gave investors the right to put the perp to Citicorp at each 
coupon reset date, the instrument effectively had a fixed, if indefinite, maturity and traded accordingly. 21
regulatory capital.  In rejecting this request, however, the Bank of England set conditions under 
which a perp could be counted as capital.
10  
Regulators in several other countries followed the Bank of England’s lead so that 
issuance of perps became a feasible solution to the perceived need to increase regulatory 
capital.
11  From the perspective of bank issuers, the perp was an especially attractive capital 
instrument because interest payments on perps, unlike dividends on preferred stock, could be 
deducted in computing taxable income.
12 
The challenge in marketing perps was to convince prospective investors that perps were 
close substitutes for fixed-maturity, floating-rate notes and money market instruments.  
Underwriters argued that the floating-rate feature made the interest-rate risk on perps equivalent 
to that on any other floating rate instrument.  Moreover, they addressed concerns about the 
infinite maturity of perps by arguing that they could be sold any time at a price close to par in a 
broad, deep secondary market. Investor confidence in the liquidity of the secondary market was 
thus key to pricing perps in line with money market and other finite-maturity instruments of 
10  The critical requirement was that perps must be automatically converted into preferred stock in the event of 
default with the number of preferred stock shares equal to the principal amount of the perp plus all arrears of interest 
and all interest accrued. Most perps were dollar-denominated and so the Bank of England also required that, in the 
event of a default by a British issuer, the dollar amount should be converted into pounds at the prevailing exchange 
rate.  In effect, investors who had dollar-denominated debt would end up with pound-sterling-denominated preferred 
shares. 
 
11  Following the Bank of England, several other central banks—including those in Australia, Canada, France and 
the United States—established conditions under which perps could be counted as capital for regulatory purposes.  
Many of these conditions were less favorable to the investor than those established by the Bank of England. The 
Japanese authorities were about to authorize the use of perps to meet capital requirements when the market 
collapsed. 
 
12  All issues of perps include a provision that allows the borrower to automatically call the perp if the tax authorities 
disallow the deductibility of the interest paid on perps as a business expense.  US banks were very late in entering the 
market because there was a presumption that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would construe the interest paid on 
perps as the equivalent of dividends and therefore not tax-deductible.  Just before the market collapsed, Goldman 
Sachs introduced a perp structure for Citibank that seemed likely to gain a favorable ruling from the IRS.  This 
involved giving investors the right to put the security back to Citibank after a specified period so that the perp was, 
for all practical purposes, equivalent to a long-dated FRN that had received a favorable ruling from the IRS. 
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comparable quality. The evidence suggests that underwriters were increasingly successful in this 
regard. 
Banks, especially Japanese banks, who were eager to invest in floating-rate, dollar-
denominated instruments during the eighties, became the main buyers of perps.
13  They found 
perps an attractive way to increase returns over interbank placements (which yielded LIBOR or 
less) at what appeared to be little additional risk. 
From 1984 to the end of 1986 the spread over LIBOR steadily declined, indicating an 
increasing marketability premium as investors gained confidence in the liquidity of the secondary 
market.  The first perps were priced at margins over LIBOR that were as much as 20-25 basis 
points higher than comparable FRNs; but, by mid-1986, the margin had declined to around 10-15 
basis points.  Figure 2 illustrates this favorable trend in the spread over LIBOR for Barclays 
Overseas Investment BV, one of the few perps for which price data is available going back to 
Fall 1984.
14  As investors grew more confident in the liquidity of the secondary market, their 
subjective probability of a systemic liquidity shock declined and the marketability premium 
increased thus reducing the yield spreads attached to perps. The spread relative to the LIBOR 
benchmark fell so low that even some governments, such as the Kingdoms of Belgium, Denmark 
and Sweden, issued perps, although they had no tax or regulatory incentive to do so. Other quasi-
government issuers included the World Bank and Hydro-Quebec. 
  [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The market grew rapidly following the inaugural NatWest issue in April 1994. The 
volume of perps outstanding stood at $3.5 billion by the end of 1984, $16 billion by the end of 
13  Some market observers estimate that as much as 80% of the perps outstanding were placed with Japanese 
financial institutions. Overall, banks held an estimated 90% of outstanding perps (IFR, December 6, 1986, p.3633). 
 
14  Figure 2 captures the declining yield spread in terms of the corresponding increase in price. 23
1985, and $22 billion by the end of 1986, accounting for 29% and 46%, respectively, of total 
FRN issuance in the latter two years (Meerschwam (1987)). Through 1986, nearly 60 perps were 
issued.  
Transactions in the secondary market for perps were cleared and settled through 
Euroclear and CEDEL, the two principal systems for clearing Eurobonds, both of which are 
designed to accomplish simultaneous delivery of assets against payment (Kamata (1990)). This 
forestalled any potential investor concerns about “settlement risk”—the risk that a counterparty 
would not fulfill its settlement obligation or that the settlement mechanism would break down—
and undoubtedly helped to sustain the confidence of investors in the liquidity of the secondary 
market. 
Investor confidence in the liquidity of a secondary market also depends on the cost of 
finding a counterparty and executing a transaction, which varies with the structure of the market. 
 Some secondary markets are primitive, direct-search markets where the transactions costs are 
borne by the initiator of the transaction and are likely to be quite heavy. Assets that are traded in 
such markets are not very liquid because, if obliged to sell on short notice, investors must often 
accept less than full market value.  At the other end of the spectrum, dealer markets are usually 
regarded as especially liquid because, in addition to providing information and matching buyers 
and sellers, dealers also provide immediacy by buying and selling from their own inventories of 
securities. The perp market was a dealer market, whose liquidity increased steadily as reflected 
by transactions costs and the size of the standard lot for which dealers would quote a price.  By 
November 1986, more than fifty dealers stood ready to quote two-way prices for standard lots of 
$5 million at a 10 basis point spread (Williams and Hole (1987)).  Although volume data is not 
available, an indirect indication of volume can be inferred from the number of perp issues in the 24
Euroclear listing of the twenty most actively traded money market issues each month.  As Figure 
3 indicates, perps were among the most actively traded money market instruments through the 
first quarter in 1987, with average daily volumes of as much as $1 billion. 
  [Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
IV.B. The Collapse  
The success of the perp market was short-lived. The proximate cause of the collapse in 
the market for perps appears to have been a rumor that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee) would require that banks deduct 
holdings of perps issued by other banks in computing their capital for regulatory purposes.
15 
Although the proposed regulations pertained only to British and American banks, the 
potential implications for banks in Japan were clear (Wagster (1996)).  As one market participant 
observed, “The Ministry of Finance in Tokyo must eventually insist on similar provisioning, 
particularly if Japanese banks are allowed to offer perpetual debt themselves.  That will just 
about kill off the market,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p.3633). 
Even the possibility of this kind of change in regulations provided a powerful incentive 
for banks holding perps to sell.  That’s precisely what happened on Wednesday, December 3, 
1986, when almost all of the core fifty dealers in the perp market were overwhelmed with sell 
15 The Committee was expected to take the view that the banking system would be more resilient, and the danger of 
contagion would be less, if nonbanks held capital claims on banks. The basis for this rumor was the proposed Anglo-
American Accord on the assessment of capital adequacy.  The proposed regulations were officially released in the 
United States on January 8, 1987, but major banks were well aware of the general outlines of the approach.  The part 
of the proposal that was of particular relevance to the market for perps was the decision regarding bank holdings of 
other banks’ capital instruments.  The official release (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and Federal Reserve Board, 1987, p.7) noted that the Bank of England already deducts such holdings 
from capital: “...except for limited concessions to allow some banks to play an active role in market-making in the 
primary (new issues) and/or secondary markets.  This policy will be maintained.  The U.S. authorities accept the 
principle underlying this policy and will monitor bank holdings of capital instruments issued by other banks and may, 
as appropriate, deduct these items on a case-by-case basis.” 25
orders and suspended normal trading.  Thus the proposed regulatory change produced a systemic 
liquidity shock 
As participants noted at the time, “We have seen the door slammed shut on the only way 
in which investors can really leave this market—trading liquidity.... The whole psychology of 
this market has now changed—it’s never going to be the same again,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, 
p.3632).  Another participant observed, “The liquidity myth has been exploded with perpetuals.  
We all now know that liquidity is only there when nobody wants to use it -- if everybody wants 
to pile out, then the market can’t accommodate it,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p.3632).  Along the 
same lines, another market participant (IFR, January 10, 1987, p. 3) concluded, “The crisis is 
basically one of confidence, and perpetuals are undergoing a general re-evaluation of worth 
separate from any underlying change in the quality and credit of the debt involved and external 
influences such as interest rates.” 
Ironically, the Basel Committee ultimately rejected this unfavorable treatment of perps.
16  
By then, however, the damage to investor confidence in market liquidity was irreparable.  
From Wednesday, December 3, 1986, the secondary market began to collapse.  Market 
makers withdrew from the market in anticipation of continuing losses. Typical dealer-to-dealer 
price spreads increased from 10 basis points to 50 basis points while at the same time standard 
lot sizes declined from $5 million to $1 million (Williams and Hole (1987)). The number of 
16  The Committee’s Consultative Paper of December 1987 (p.9) stated:  “The Committee carefully considered the 
possibility of requiring deduction of banks’ holdings of capital issued by other banks.... Several G-10 supervisory 
authorities currently require such a deduction to be made in order to discourage the banking system as a whole from 
creating cross-holdings of capital, rather than drawing capital from outside investors.  The Committee is very 
conscious that such double-gearing (or “double-leveraging”) can have systemic dangers for the banking system by 
making it more vulnerable to the rapid transmission of problems from one institution to another and some members 
consider these dangers justify a policy of full deduction of such holdings... Despite these concerns, however, the 
Committee as a whole is not presently in favor of a general policy of deducting all holdings of other banks’ capital, 
on the grounds that to do so could impede certain significant and desirable changes taking place in the structure of 
domestic banking systems.” 
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active market makers plummeted from 50 to fewer than 10 by March 1987, and these functioned 
mainly as brokers—trying to match buyers with sellers—rather than standing ready to buy or sell 
at a stated spread.  After December 1986, only perps issued by the British clearing banks made 
the list of the twenty most active issues maintained by Euroclear. As illustrated in Figure 3, by 
May 1987, perps had dropped from the list altogether. In the absence of a liquid secondary 
market, the new issue market completely disappeared. 
  Secondary market prices fell sharply during this period.
17 Figure 4 plots the value from 
November 1984 through June 1991 of a price index of eleven perps issued by British Clearing 
Banks. The sudden collapse and lack of recovery of the secondary market is clearly evident.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
As further evidence that concerns over the liquidity of the secondary market, rather than 
default risk, were at the heart of the difficulty, consider the behavior of the four perps issued by 
Standard Chartered Bank (Figure 5).  The perp with a put option continued to trade at par, while 
the other three issues that could not be put back to the issuer declined sharply in price, losing as 
much as half their value by December 1990. 
  [Insert Figure 5 about here] 
The events of December 1986 had exposed the narrow investor base of the secondary 
market for perps.  The episode made clear that the liquidity of the perp secondary market 
depended critically on confidence in the breadth of the market—on the belief that other investors 
would not change their portfolio preferences in the same way at the same time. When a liquidity 
shock affected all the bank holders of perps, the negative implications of the overwhelming 
17  With the exception of issues that gave holders the option of putting the notes back to the issuer at par value, such 
as the issue by Standard Chartered Bank discussed below, and by the World Bank and the Kingdom of Belgium. 27
concentration of perps in the hands of Japanese banks for the prospect of additional systemic 
liquidity shocks became all too evident. 
The gradual increase in the marketability premium as the secondary market became more 
liquid is consistent with our model as was the dramatic collapse of the secondary market after the 
experience of a systemic liquidity shock.  More broadly, Davis (1989) and Guttentag and Herring 
(1984) have shown that innovative financial instruments may be particularly subject to disaster 
myopia because the empirical record for judging how they will perform over a variety of 
conditions is very limited and those who market a new instrument have an incentive to 
emphasize the robustness of its features.  The consequence is that buyers often have a very 
imperfect a priori understanding of the attributes of a new instrument.  It is not unusual for 
buyers of new instruments to extrapolate favorable performance into the future.
18  Because the 
secondary markets in perps were well organized, with low transaction costs and more that fifty 
dealers providing immediacy by standing willing to buy or sell perps at stated prices, it must have 
been tempting to dismiss the probability of a systemic liquidity shock as inconsequential.  
  After the collapse, why didn’t nonbanks (who, even if the rumor had proved to be true, 
would not be penalized by the regulators for holding perps) buy the bank holdings of perps?  
Why didn’t the market quickly equilibrate at a new lower price that would compensate investors 
for higher perceived risk with higher anticipated capital gains?  Prices did fall, but the volume of 
trading activity never recovered. Ironically, the fundamental problem standing in the way of a 
recovery was also the lack of breadth in the market. The Japanese regulatory authorities 
permitted Japanese banks (which held the vast majority of perps) to defer recognition of the 
18  This normal tendency toward disaster myopia was undoubtedly exacerbated by the general inexperience of many 
market participants.  One senior banker admitted that, “When I look around the trading areas of my bank, and realize 
that most of the dealers are well under 30 years of age, and have never been exposed to a consistent bear market, I 
realize that this is probably the greatest single area of exposure I have,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p.3653). 28
capital loss until the perps were sold. Market makers and other potential market participants 
believed that any rise in the prices of perps would be swiftly met by sales of perps by Japanese 
banks and so they were unwilling to buy.  But, so long as perps traded below par, Japanese 
banks, which were under international pressure to increase regulatory capital, were not eager to 
sell below par and realize a capital loss, particularly since the stream of cash flows from perps 
was never in doubt. If Japanese banks had been obliged to mark their holdings to market, it is 
likely that the volume of trading would have increased, albeit at lower initial prices, and perps 
would have been redistributed to a broader range of investors, thereby paving the way for a 
restoration of liquidity. 
 
IV.C. Postscript 
The collapse of the secondary market for perps caused a sharp decline in prices of 12% to 
25% due to the collapse of the marketability premium. These discounts for illiquidity are 
consistent with other measures of the discount for illiquidity reported by the SEC (1971) and 
Pratt (1989) with regard to letter stocks.
19  Using the midpoints of the discount range for letter 
stocks relative to their freely traded counterparts, Pratt found that the discount was 25.8%. The 
SEC Study (1971) found that most letter stock transactions were at a discount of 10% to 30% of 
the analogous securities traded freely on the public exchanges. 
Several attempts have been made to restore liquidity to perps by repackaging the 
promised cash flows as instruments with fixed maturities (Meerschwam (1987)). The basic idea 
19  Pratt (1989) notes that “A letter stock is identical in all respects to the freely traded stock of a public company 
except that it is restricted from trading on the stock exchanges for a certain period” and reports comparisons of the 
value of such letter stocks to their freely traded counterparts. Publicly traded corporations issue letter stock 
frequently in making acquisitions or raising capital when the time and cost of registering the new stock with the SEC 
would make the transaction impractical.  Even though such stock cannot be sold to the public on the open market, it 
may be sold in private transactions under certain circumstances.  Such transactions must be reported to the SEC 
where they become a matter of public record (Pratt, 1989, p.240). 29
was to add a high quality zero-coupon bond (an instrument that was all principal repayment with 
no interest payments) to the perp (an instrument with only interest payments and no principal 
repayment) to create a synthetic, dated FRN that would appeal to a broader range of investors.  
These efforts have met with limited success, but they did succeed in producing a lower bound for 
the price of perps.  This transformation could restore some of the marketability premium because 
the secondary market for FRNs remained liquid.  In addition, some issuers are known to have 
called substantially all their outstanding perps at prices close to face value, apparently to preserve 
or strengthen their reputations in the credit markets. 
The perp episode emphasizes the importance of market breadth in establishing and 
maintaining liquid secondary markets. Market breadth can be achieved by placing the security 
with a broad range of investors during the initial public offering.  We have presented a case in 
which a secondary market became very liquid despite its narrow investor base.  But the liquidity 
of the secondary market proved to be temporary.  Once a systemic liquidity shock revealed the 
lack of breadth, the secondary market could not recover.  Although it is still possible to have 
systemic liquidity shocks with a heterogeneous investor base, they are likely to be transitory since 
investors’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are likely to predominate most of the time and investors 
can expect to mutualize their idiosyncratic shocks by trading in secondary market.  The 
marketability premium may fall briefly, but it is likely to be restored relatively rapidly. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
  We have provided new insights into why markets crash. As we have shown, markets can 
crash even in the absence of the two conditions that are thought in the literature to give rise to a 
crash: the bursting of a bubble concerning fundamental value or an exacerbation of information 30
asymmetry about the value of the fundamental determinants of asset prices. Our theoretical 
framework and the perp episode demonstrate that market collapse can be an endogenous 
phenomenon, having nothing to do with the fundamental value of assets, and everything to do 
with the liquidity needs of the investor clientele that holds the assets and their beliefs about 
whether these needs can be met in the future. Of course, the collapse of the marketability 
premium can also accompany the collapse of a fundamental value bubble or an exacerbation of 
information asymmetry, deepening the crisis.  
Our framework readily extends to the case considered by Glauber (1997) in which 
everyone adopts the same trading model, leading to potentially harmful herding behavior. And as 
we have demonstrated, the triggers for such behavior need not arise from asset fundamentals. 
Recent empirical evidence of commonality in liquidity (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
(2000)) lends support to this view. 
The perp episode emphasizes the importance of market breadth in establishing and 
maintaining liquidity in financial markets. Market breadth can be assured through broad-based 
placement of securities. But the perp episode also provides an example of how the effects of 
systemic shocks can be mitigated through security design. As illustrated in Figure 5, the Standard 
Chartered Bank perp with the attached put option continued to trade at par throughout the crisis, 
while the other three Standard Chartered perps, which had no puts attached, followed the other 
perps down when the market crashed. The effect here is remarkably similar to deposit insurance 
in the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) framework, especially since there was no change in Standard 
Chartered Bank’s credit quality that could potentially have undermined the value of the put 
option that provided a de facto maturity for this issue.  31
Appendix 
 
The t = 1 equilibrium in case 1: 
Individual i’s holding at time 1 is given by the first order condition to (2): 
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we can aggregate over the N agents to obtain the expression for the equilibrium price, 
1
1 P , in (3), 
from which (5) and (6) follow directly. 
 
The t = 0 equilibrium in case 1: 
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which is equivalent to: 
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Substituting from the time 1 first order condition, Z   reduces to: 
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where  iiA θθθ ∆=−  . This expression is of the form: 
2 2 () ( )( ) ( )( ) iA i A i A Z   A B C D E F θθ θ θ θ θ =+∆ + ∆ + + ∆ +                   (A.8) 
where C = D = 0, and A, B, E and F are non-random. Krishnan (1987) derives the moment 
generating function of a non-homogenous quadratic in a correlated bivariate normal. 
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2
θ σ ∆  and 
2
A θ σ  are the variances of  i θ ∆  and  A θ , respectively. Taking the first order condition with 
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yields the expression for 
1
0 P  in (8). 
 
The necessary condition (19) for offering a market: 
In the case where the probability of a systemic liquidity shock, ξ, is non-zero, the total expected 
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Since market makers have zero expected profits, 
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which is quadratic in λ. It is straightforward to show that the condition in (19) must be satisfied 
in order for this quadratic equation to yield a real non-negative root for λ. If (19) is satisfied, 
market makers will offer a market. If (19) is not satisfied, there is no real non-negative value for 
λ at which market makers can expect to generate sufficient revenue to recover their set up costs. 34
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